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Abstract 
The article provides an alternative approach to previous dynamics of relationship amongst key actors in the 
banking industry. It sees the re-emergence of the global banking industry from the ruins of the last financial 
crisis as an opportunity for its reconfiguration. This reconfiguration was premised on a neo-institutional 
inquisition that finds accommodation for strategic choice, institutional theory and legitimacy; before placing 
these theories within the context of banking. This generated a conceptual outcome in a customer legitimacy 
model called legitimacy pyramid for the banking industry. This is a proposition for banking industry re-
configuration to move beyond a dialogue of regulator cum banks and embrace a ‘trialogue’ that recognise the 
customers’ voice and accords it primacy. 
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1. Introduction 
The global economy is yet to fully recover from the aftermath of the seismic shock fostered upon it by activities 
traceable to prior functioning of the global banking system. Varied commentaries have been provided on the 
unfortunate episode termed the ‘housing market bubble’ or ‘the 2007/2008 financial crises. Benediktsdottir et al 
(2011) gave account of how the entire Icelandic banking industry was brought to its knee in the wake of this 
crisis; Black (2010) drew on its manifestations in the US, Ireland and Iceland to warn on the systemic dangers 
inherent in mega-sized multi-national banks; and Butler (2009) focused on the lessons that can be learnt from 
regulatory failures associated with the crisis. An attempt at a fundamental re-definition of relationship amongst 
key actors in the banking institution remains scarce despite a blame game between banks (or bankers) and their 
regulator(s). Riaz (2009) attempted a diagnosis of what went wrong via an institutional theory framework and 
concluded that the banking institution and its actors represent contagion of legitimacy but fell short at proposing 
any radical transformation of the status quo. Branston et al (2012) argued via a strategic framework for a policy 
re-direction that will give greater recognition to the customer in the strategic functioning of banks. Current effort 
is premised on a neo-institutional stance that positions the customer as a legitimacy actor.   
The paper aims to use a neo-institutional perspective to make the case for fundamental institutional 
reconfiguration that gives primacy to the customer in the ensuing post-crisis discussion amongst key actors in the 
banking institution. Amongst its other objectives are; (a.) relate strategic choice, institutional theory and 
legitimacy within a neo-institutional framework that revolved around banking (b.) appraise the various strands of 
legitimacy within the context of financial service practice (c.) position the customer as a legitimacy agent in any 
attempt at institutional reform of banking (d.) generate an institutional relationship model for the banking 
industry that gives primacy to the customer. 
The rest of the article is structured into three sections. The first section links strategic choice, 
institutional theory and legitimacy to neo-institutional theory with inferences drawn from banking. This is 
followed by a focus on conceptual development and the final section is the conclusion.  
      
2. Neo-institutional Theory: A Theoretical Triad Encompassing Strategic Choice, Institutional Theory 
and Legitimacy 
According to Suchman (1995:576) “legitimacy and institutionalization are virtually synonymous”. Suchman 
(1995:572) also argued that legitimacy seem to have ben balkanised into two distinct strands i.e. one with a 
strategic outlook and the other with an institutional outlook. The strategic outlook on legitimacy was hinged on a 
managerial focus with deployment of symbols to gain support from the society (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Pfeffer, 1981; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Bailey et al 2006; Branston et al 2012 are 
representative of works in this category). On the other hand, institutional outlook on legitimacy takes a rather 
detached view with emphasis on how the dynamics of structuration in the various sectors of an industry elicits 
cultural pressures that are beyond the purposive control of any of its constituent organizations (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983, 1991; Meyer & Scott, 1983; Zucker, 1987; Meyer & Rowan, 1991; Scott 2007, 2001 typifies this 
stance). 
Consequently, neo-institutional theory with its focus on change finds accommodation for strategic 
choice, institutional theory and legitimacy. These theories are next explored within the purview of a banking 
institution that needs to re-negotiate legitimacy with the customer in particular and the rest of society in general. 
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2.1 Strategic Choice 
Strategic Choice can be defined as the process whereby holders of power in organizations take decisions on the 
direction of strategic pursuits (Child 1972; 1997:45). Strategic choice involves top management deciding upon 
specific course of action to be taken by a firm in response to environment, competition or available resources as 
well as decision about structure, policies and procedures of the organisation (Child 1997). According to Wilson 
and McKiernan (2011:458), strategic choice emphasizes a theory of managerial autonomy through a choice of 
thought and action. It simply connotes that organizational features are chosen, to a degree, by top management. 
This theory places premium on autonomy and freedom which senior managers express through their choice of 
thought and action that boldly puts their imprint on the strategic direction of their organizations. Organisational 
dynamics is construed from the stance of political power and social interactions which are shaped significantly 
by those at the top.   
Child (1997:48) clarified the term ‘strategic’ to mean issues that are vital to an organization as a whole, 
in particular those with a potential to impact on its ability to flourish in a competitive environment or where it is 
faced with the challenge of maintaining credibility. He stressed its close relevance to the notion of ‘stratagem’, 
which is an attempt to achieve an aim through interaction with, or against, others. Credibility for a bank is often 
achieved through interaction with the regulator or the customer. The run on Northern Rock (a UK bank) was 
damage to credibility inflicted by customers.   
The strategic choice framework is based on an assumption that governance is the most critical (but not 
exclusive) issue in productive activities, focus being directed at strategic decision makers, the basis of their 
strategic choice and the effect of the choices they make (Bailey et al., 2006). The framework is reliant on 
imperfect competition, gives prominence to economic power, ignore determinism but favour voluntarism. It sees 
the main reason for production organisation as the generation and use of knowledge for making choices about 
strategic direction for business activity, and places undue reliance on an extreme governance mode upon which 
alternatives are benchmarked. This extreme mode of governance is governance by direction - a hierarchy based 
system for creation and use of knowledge wherein planning, choice and resource allocation is in line with the 
wishes of an exclusive core; irrespective of concurrence or dissension by others (Sacchetti and Sugden, 2010; 
Sacchetti, 2004).  
This seemingly unfettered autonomy by top management and the over-concentration of organisational 
power implies that there is a potential for abuse or arbitrariness. The inherent agency dilemma in over-
concentration of corporate power in ruling elites (i.e. top management) may run counter to society’s perception 
of fairness. Consequently, strategic choice also advocates an alternative governance mode in which important 
decisions of firms (or institutions) shall evolve through democratic principles as critical for reconciliation with 
the public interest, with individual sector viewed in terms of manifest impact on the general economy (Branston 
et al 2012: 233). Corporate governance code for an institution or economy and individual firms’ corporate 
governance policies are evidence of this view in business. 
Executives are an important element in the promotion of institutionalism and conformity (Kraatz and 
Moore 2002:123). The focus of strategic choice on power holders in organizations (i.e. top management 
executives or leaders) may have provided an important bridge in linking strategic choice to institutional theory. 
An understanding of institutional change must place emphasis on values, interests, beliefs and actions of 
organizations’ elites and not neglect the bigger social and economic forces that often influence change process 
(Kraatz and Moore 2002:122). Child (1997:53-54) agreed that the control which managers have on the 
environment of their organisations is restricted by the counterbalancing controls vested in institutions. He 
submitted that neither an individual nor organization constitute environment; environment is made up of other 
actors in different organizations or amongst the public. Thus, the environment cannot be restricted to the 
subjective interpretations of a particular group of organization players. Actors interact within the environment of 
institutions. This explains why contemporary conceptualization of strategic choice is based on an amalgam that 
takes into consideration; firm specific resource constraint, peculiar industry conditions, and institutional factors 
of a macro-nature (Peng, Wang and Jiang, 2008; Droege, Lane and Spiller 2009). This evidently maps strategic 
choice unto institutional theory. 
 
2.2 Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory maintains that organizations find social reward in legitimacy, resources, and survival 
provided they accept coercive, normative, and mimetic institutional pressures (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983). 
This leads to the generation of isomorphism through a reflection of contextual values, ceremonies, and symbols 
in structure, strategy, and practice within an organization (Scott, 2007; Zucker, 1987). Organizations are prone to 
yielding to coercive and normative pressures arising from their institutional context (for example banks adhering 
to capital base requirements or to a corporate governance code) as these are likely to confer social privileges 
from their stakeholders.  
The traditional concern of institutional theory is hinged on the securing of legitimacy and standing by 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.16, 2014 
 
3 
groups and organizations through conformation to rules and norms in their institutional environment (Scott, 
2007). Zucker (1987) observed that normative pressures from within or outside an organization (e.g. government 
or other organizations) can influence or constrain managerial action. In as much as such pressures are validated 
by senior managers, then there is an alignment between the organization and its institutional environment. 
Institutional theorists generally find some comfort in the belief that the structural forms (together with prevalent 
values and identities) of relevant external institutions impose themselves unto entities dependent on them for the 
purpose of legitimacy, staffing or resourcing (Child 1997:45). 
Institutions can also be a template for economic activities. Every economic order needs a minimum of 
institutional infrastructure for effective functioning. The importance of such institutional infrastructure have been 
repeatedly emphasised for business pursuits in emerging or developing economies (Khanna and Palepu 2006). 
Mahoney et al. (2009) were unequivocal in asserting that there are circumstances in which public institutional 
environments impact positively on value creation in the private sector. Banking industry consolidation or reform 
in response to institutional crisis represents typical example.  
Institutional theory is fast emerging as an umbrella theory that finds accommodation for such theories 
as resource based view of the firm (see Oliver 1997) and resource dependence theory (see Proenca et al., 2000; 
Tsai and Child, 1997). Institutional theory in its traditional form has been accused of rather promoting inertia and 
resistance with little or no attention devoted to change and adaptation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Bada et al., 
2004; Kraatz and Moore 2002).This criticism may have emanated from a perception that institutional theory 
overlooked the role of the manager, thereby falsely assuming that organizations are passive entities whose course 
is shaped by institutional context (Bada et al., 2004). This is the crux of the difference between strategic choice 
and institutional theory.  
Zucker (1983:4) affirmed that institutional environments are limiting for an organization and plays 
important deterministic role on such things as internal structure, organizational growth, fall and survival. 
Similarly, DiMaggio and Powell (1991) saw institutional environments as thriving on conformity and acceptance, 
the reality of which manifests in the turning of organizations into ‘iron cages’ and makes them prisoners of 
institutional isomorphism. Actors invested with the power to make rational decisions build around themselves an 
environment that makes it impossible for any materialisation of further change in years to come (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991).Thus institutional theory in its traditional form appears rather diametrically opposed to adaptation 
theories that see organizations as dynamic entities in an ever changing environment. 
This traditional precept in institutional theory has however given way to a richer understanding 
through the analyses of adaptation processes done by DiMaggio and Powell (1991). This new understanding as 
observed by North (1995) affirms that institutional pressures are ever changing, with constant interaction 
amongst institutions and organizations; meaning that a process exists for adapting to emerging institutional 
demands and affirms that institutional change is a product of the actions and dynamics emanating from 
organizations. Naughton (2008) observed that shifting ideological values increase institutional capacity for 
receptiveness to conflicting views on the social circumstance of an organisation. The ‘iron cage’ perception is 
being unshackled with a dynamic view taking root.   
The new institutional theory has offered meaningful insights with a bearing on change and adaptation 
through institutionalism processes (Johnson et al., 2000) such as legitimacy, isomorphism and mimetic process. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991) categorized isomorphism into three distinct classes. The first termed “coercive’’ 
isomorphism emanates from resource dependence and legitimacy needs.  The second type is called “mimetic’’ 
(resonate with the words ‘mimicry’ or ‘mimicking’) isomorphism i.e. social actors’ (be it nations, individuals or 
organizations) tendency to imitate others that are perceived as successful or in this context-legitimate. 
“Normative” isomorphism was recognized as the third form of isomorphism. It is defined as: “collective values 
that bring about conformity of thought and deed within institutional environments’’.  
These well-known pillars have been built upon in explaining dynamism of institutions. For instance, 
the quick acceptance or institutionalization for a cognitive idea like ‘shareholder value’ can lead to the 
possibility of mobilizing actors in favour of political change to existing institutions via legal reforms favouring 
shareholders (Gourevitch and Shinn 2005). This dynamism emanates as a consequence from interactions 
amongst institutional pillars over time e.g. cognitive ‘frames’ providing legitimacy for new strategies for 
political reform, or coercive rules generating new interaction amongst professional groups with potential for 
social norms to be reshaped (Campbell 2005). The significant attention paid to isomorphism has led to scholars 
being accused of giving an ‘over socialized’ account on institutions. This explains increased interest in a 
deepening of comparative - through systematic ways for institutional change analysis (Streeck and Thelen 2005; 
Crouch 2005; Campbell 2004).  
Neo-institutionalism may not necessarily be a model change theory, it has offered a rational basis for 
the explanation of not just the similitude of isomorphism and organizational stability, but afforded an 
understanding of heterogeneity, organizational behaviour and competitive positioning in response to the 
dynamism and turbulence of environments (Park and Krishnan, 2003). However, the misuse or mis-application 
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of institutional theory has not gone unnoticed. Suddaby (2010) criticised the application of institutional theory 
beyond its original intent of offering explanation on work, language, categories, and aesthetics. 
Institutions are never cast in stone despite common reference to institutional pillars. Institutional 
Pillars are not immovable. Droege and Brown-Johnson (2007) espoused the concept of meso-institutions, 
purporting that institutions can take on different identities when prevailing ideologies become susceptible to 
cracks. Actions thus become the rules of the game rather than the rules of the game dictating actions. Sydow et al. 
(2009) broke organizational path dependence into the process of pre-formation, formation and lock-in phases. A 
combination of path dependence (Sydow et al 2009), meso-institution (Droege and Brown-Johnson 2007) and 
deinstitutionalization (Oliver 1992) make for abundant clarity that institutionalization is not only a route to 
stability but also has potential for dynamism. 
Formal (e.g. regulations and laws) and informal (e.g. conventions, norms and beliefs) features are 
pervasive in institutions and they act in concert to explain social conduct. Institutional theory viewed from a 
sociological stance maintains that competition for resource is not the only goal of organizational actors and 
organizations as they ultimately seek social acceptance and legitimacy. Macro-institutions exert significant 
influence in the shaping of interactions at lower socio-activity level and in terms of organizational behaviour. 
Understanding institutional environment is important for understanding the dynamics of social systems as the 
interplay of forces within institutional environment act as either guide or constraint on the legitimacy seeking 
actions of organisations and organisational actors (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003).This “dualism” places a demand 
for stability and engagement with institutional forces for structure on organisations; so that they are appropriately 
positioned to embrace change and generate positive enactment with their environments (Farjoun, 2010).  
Scott (2007) reasoned that institutional theory relies on three analytical levels which may be viewed as 
hierarchical. At the top of this hierarchy are societal (as well as global) institutions with models and menus being 
formally initiated but informally enacted. This exemplifies the institutional context: what is deemed possible, 
acceptable, and legitimate, thereby shaping, constraining and facilitating not just structures but actions at lower 
levels. Idemudia (2007) observed that societal values vary from culture to culture implying additional constraint 
for firms (especially multinational ones). Thus, legitimacy posturing will have to incorporate prevailing morals 
and social responsibility of local society even when organisational values are at variance with social expectations 
(Palazzo and Scherer 2006; Kennedy and Fiss, 2009). 
The second level is reflected in the governance structures, first within the organizational fields (i.e. 
industry) and then that of the organizations themselves (i.e. firm). Organization field meaning a collective of 
organizations functioning in the same domain (as evidenced by service similarity e.g. banking industry), and 
including those other organizations with critical influence on their performance (e.g. suppliers, partners, lenders 
etc.). The difference that exists among organizations in terms of structure, culture, size, function and change 
capacity makes analysis at the organisational level important. Organizations impact and are also constantly 
impacted (through the aforementioned organizational features); by the bigger institutional environment and their 
organizational field.  
The third and final level of analysis finds expression as actors in institutional settings, which can be 
individuals or groups. The failure of institutions to meet the expectation of actors can raise legitimacy questions. 
Legitimacy doubts about an institution is a precursor to institutional ‘irrelevance’, ‘death’, ‘destruction’, 
‘breakdown’, ‘failure’ or ‘crisis’. The re-building process may be costly for both an institution and its actors. 
Such rebuilding exercise involves three stages fractured ideology, retrospective legitimation, and actions-as-rules 
(Droege and Brown-Johnson 2007). A banking industry ideology that sees change emanating mainly from 
engagement between regulator and banks has been damaged by the last financial crisis and a new kind of 
engagement or legitimacy basis is deemed necessary. 
 
2.3 Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions (Suchman 1995: 
574). A legitimate organization is one whose actions are perceived by the broader society as being desirable or 
appropriate (Santana 2012:257). Mitchell et al. (1997:867) argued that ‘‘legitimacy is a social good, [that] it is 
something larger and more shared than a mere self-perception, and [that] it may be defined and negotiated 
differently at various levels of social organization’’. Legitimacy has evolved as a focal point for an expansive 
theoretical construct with an interest in how organizational actors are constructed, constrained and empowered 
by the interactions of cognitive and normative forces. Acceptability demand from society imposes the need for 
organisational legitimacy to give cognizance to stakeholder legitimacy (Santana 2012; Neville et al. 2011; Parent 
and Deephouse 2007). This link between legitimacy and perception by society is plagued by a crucial challenge 
– measurement is often difficult (Santana 2012; Parent and Deephouse 2007; Eesley and Lenox 2006).  
Though, Droege, Lane and Spiller (2011) agreed with Suchman (1995) on the synonymous association 
between legitimacy and institutionalization; however, they argued that such generalization failed to take account 
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of fine-grained nuances evident in the different types of legitimacy. Suchman (1995) categorized legitimacy as 
being either pragmatic, cognitive or moral, stating that conferment is external to organizations. Prominent 
amongst these sources of legitimacy external to organizations are the customers and the general public. This 
rings particularly true in the case of the banking industry. However, both organisation insiders and outsiders can 
confer legitimacy even though organisations’ posturing for legitimacy seem to be directed more at outsiders. 
Employees are an important insider within organizations with respect to legitimacy. Loss of confidence by 
employees in their organisation may put a restraint on loyalty and commitment which ultimately results in a 
withdrawal of legitimacy (Maclean and Benham 2010; Maguire and Phillip 2008). 
The precept of legitimacy evolves from a collective compilation in which personal meanings are 
constructed and negotiated via sensemaking and sensegiving processes (Weick et al. 2005). Consequently, the 
different interpretations of legitimacy within a paradigmatic framework of “banking’’ (as an institution) and the 
“customer’’ (as a key stakeholder) is subsequently explored with a view to codifying a legitimacy model within 
this context.  
Pragmatic legitimacy is first considered. Droege, Lane and Spiller (2011:102) defined pragmatic 
legitimacy as a calculative, self-interest and focused form of organizational legitimacy involving the gains 
accruable to actors in relationships that bothers on either exchange or exercise of influence. Pragmatic legitimacy 
shares common ground with power dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). Pragmatic legitimacy is attained 
through fairness in exchange relationship; with superior power holder in a relationship perceived as not using his 
position to exploit the weaker partner. Adherents of the view that big banks formed from merger represent threat 
to competition (e.g. Carow et al 2006; Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi 2007; Craig and Hardee 2007; De Graeve, 
De Jonghe and Vander Vennet 2007) or effective regulation (e.g. Benediktsdottir et al. 2011; Black 2010; Butler 
2009; Pisani-Ferry and Sapir 2010) will find justification for their stance in this form of legitimacy. Big banks 
resulting from merger have gained monopolistic or oligopolistic power that allows them to extract higher rent 
from the customer. From a regulatory perspective, such banking giants may become bigger than their domicile 
national economies, which re-defines power construct between such banks and their supervising national 
authority (Vives 2011). Intervention is necessary to ensure that customers who ‘buy’ financial services or 
products are fairly treated due to the inherent oligopolistic tendencies in banking (Mullineux 2011:445). 
Consumer protection agencies, financial service ombudsman and anti-trust agencies derive their authorities from 
pragmatic legitimacy. 
Cognitive legitimacy is another type of legitimacy. It arises from the acceptance by society that an 
organisation serves a purpose, or fulfils an essential role evidenced by social benefits (Suchman 1995; Droege, 
Lane and Spiller 2011).  Cognitive legitimacy is evident in organisations in the form of certifications, 
professional associations and formalized operations (Droege, Lane and Spiller 2011:102). Though rating 
agencies have come under severe criticism for their role in the 2008 global financial crisis (see Benediktsdottir et 
al. 2011 and Oghojafor and Adebisi 2012 for their infamous role in respect of how this crisis engulfed Icelandic 
and Nigerian banks respectively); they represent part of the cognitive legitimacy apparatus in the banking 
industry. Shepherd and Zacharakis (2003) viewed cognitive legitimacy has been attained when the broader social 
community accepts such proxies as proof of an organization’s legitimacy or when the community becomes 
familiar with her top executives or products.  
Cognitive legitimacy for banks is essentially premised on the important role ascribed to them in 
economic functioning. Their intermediation role in resource re-allocation is seen as pivotal to society’s progress 
(Branston et al 2012:233; Oghojafor and Adebisi 2012:148; Laeven 2011:4.2). This legitimacy is under serious 
threat when banks become perceived by society as having stopped behaving as banks (Llewellyn 2010:8). This is 
a reality confronting bankers and customers in the aftermath of recent global financial crisis. Legitimacy for 
banks and the institution it represents has become severely eroded. Indeed, banking typify groups of institutions 
and organizations forming “contagions of legitimacy” whose survival or failure as an institution or organization 
in such circumstance is intricately linked (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006; Riaz 2009). 
Moral legitimacy is the third type of legitimacy. Moral legitimacy is bestowed through conformity of 
an organisation to what society prescribes as right or wrong. Moral legitimacy as against pragmatic legitimacy is 
premised not just on whether the society benefits but stems from an evaluation of an activity as being the right 
thing to do (Suchman 1995:579) . Also moral legitimacy contrasts with cognitive legitimacy because it seeks to 
examine organisational credibility with respect to the society’s definition of what is right while cognitive 
legitimacy accepts an organization’s conformity to what is right in the eye of society without making any effort 
to assess the validity of this faith (Droege, Lane, and Spiller 2011:104). For instance, is it morally justified for 
governments and banking industry regulators to continue to facilitate or promote M&A and create bigger banks 
whose performance antecedents does not seem to stack up in an efficiency scrutiny (Galbraith 2010; Johnson 
2010; Prasch 2012). Palazzo and Scherer (2006) contended that there is a move from pragmatic legitimacy 
towards moral legitimacy, indicating that, society has moved from mere stable expectations of the firm to an 
active engagement by firms for a justification of their actions. This finds expression in corporate social 
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responsibility which is premised on the stakeholder theory. 
Consequential, procedural, structural, and personal legitimacy are all types of moral legitimacy arising 
from the level at which assessment is being made. Consequential legitimacy is conferred by society on an 
organisation based on what society perceives as its accomplishment. Two important issues often complicate the 
understanding of consequential legitimacy – (a.) What does society define as valuable output? (b.) How to deal 
with outputs that are by their very nature immeasurable e.g. welfare services. Moral judgement and social values 
therefore takes pre-eminence in the definition of consequential legitimacy (Droege, Lane, and Spiller 2011). For 
instance, overall bank industry lending may increase, but society may be more concerned about lending to small 
and medium businesses or priority sectors of the economy such as agriculture or manufacturing.   
Kennedy and Fiss, (2009) argued that since moral legitimacy stems from society, organisations or 
institutions will have to defer to society’s definition even when society’s moral belief differs from that of the 
organisation or institution. This may raise an ethical dilemma for banks with a global presence, since what is 
moral differs from one society to another. The moral dilemma faced by bankers is also evident in the 
intermediary role assigned to banks in an economy. This places their employees amongst a class of business 
practitioners that are described as ‘agents’. Thus, the payment of bonuses to bankers may be perceived by society 
as being in line with the parasitic nature of the phenomenon termed ‘agentism’. Hutton (2012:2) described 
“agentism” as ‘agentist’ capitalism”…a vast web of ‘cream-skimming’ services associated with brokerage and 
agency – everything from investment banking to head-hunters, estate agents and football agents – taking a cut on 
some transaction or deal but adding precious little value despite sky-high personal rewards…(cited in Ndhlovu 
2012:105).  
The dim view of investment banking currently held by society emanates from a loss of consequential 
legitimacy and finds expression in current global disdain for universal banking. Geyfman and Yeager 
(2009:1667) associated universal banks with higher total and unsystematic risk compared to traditional banks. 
What Mullineux (2011: 444) described as structural solutions, similar to a Glass-Steagall style regulation, 
separating investment or casino banking from retail banking based on deposit taking has now gained broad 
appeal. Butler (2009: 68) advocated the separation of investment banking and commercial banking amongst 
ways of ensuring that banks do not become so big that they constitute systemic risk. Similar risk argument was 
used by the Nigerian regulator for stopping universal banking (Agbonkpolor 2010). This growing dislike for 
investment banking is not without dissent. For instance, Leach (2008) argued that investment banks are not the 
problem but a lack of effective supervision of investment banks.     
Closely related to consequential legitimacy is procedural legitimacy which is gained through the use of 
procedures that are socially acceptable and contrary to consequential legitimacy, it takes into cognizance how 
(i.e. procedures through which) outcomes are achieved (Droege, Lane, and Spiller 2011). The era of financial 
liberalization in the Nigerian banking industry’s historical development offers insight into the distinction 
between consequential and procedural legitimacy. Though financial liberalization adopted following the 
structural adjustment programme embarked upon by the Nigerian government in 1986 resulted in significant 
contribution from the financial service sector to the GDP, in fact contributing more to GDP than manufacturing 
by 1990 (Lewis and Stein 1997). The reality of this achievement is that the financial sector was practically 
involved in financial disintermediation as majority of banks were courting political favours to access official 
foreign currency auctions and make quick gains through the pervasive practice of arbitrage (Beck et al., 2005; 
Hesse, 2007; Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako 2007). Thus, Nigerian banks may have attained consequential 
legitimacy following the Structural Adjustment Programme but with hindsight this industry may have failed 
woefully at securing procedural legitimacy. 
Sometimes legitimacy emanate from conformity to organizational structures that are socially 
acceptable with no consideration as to whether outputs of these structures have any value for society, such 
legitimacy is termed structural legitimacy (Droege, Lane, and Spiller 2011:105). For example, meeting a 
prescribed minimum capital requirement by a bank does not necessarily mean that such bank shall subsequently 
be run efficiently. Just as mere compliance with a specified board composition does not necessarily mean that 
the board’s actual functioning will definitely reflect good corporate governance. The compliance of US financial 
institutions with the Sarbanes-Oxley act enacted in the wake of the Enrol scandal did not deter them from 
engaging in similar financial shenanigans that left the world economy in comatose over the housing market 
bubble. Similarly, compliance with a financial reporting standard (such as the IFRS) by a nation or an industry 
does not necessarily guarantee sound economy (Ritsumeikan 2011; Judge, Li, and Pinsker, 2010). Motivations 
for IFRS adoption by developing nations find better rationalization through social pressures of legitimacy than 
economic rationale (Ritsumeikan 2011: 70). This exemplifies the meaning of structural legitimacy. Which 
provides explanation for countries like Kazakhstan, Malawi, or Peru  being quick adopters of IFRS while 
countries with great traditions in accounting such as the USA, Canada and Australia have slowed in adoption or 
convergence to IFRS (Ritsumeikan 2011: 63). 
The last type of moral legitimacy is personal legitimacy. Personal legitimacy is the least stable of the 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.16, 2014 
 
7 
different types of moral legitimacy due to its being closely associated with individual traits and less of 
organizational attributes (Droege, Lane, and Spiller 2011:105). It is dependent on personal charisma which 
society judges as bringing value to it through actions and accomplishments. The transient character of personal 
charisma notwithstanding, it is still a route to legitimacy. The reality though is that such legitimacy is short-lived.  
“Whether valid or not, the perception that charismatic individuals can transcend and reorder established routines 
often allows organizations to dodge potentially stigmatizing events” (Suchman, 1995: 581). Loss of personal 
legitimacy is very common in banking. Fred Goodwin’s role that led to the current state of affairs at Royal Bank 
of Scotland (Ashton 2013) and Bob Diamond’s implication in the LIBOR rate fixing scandal at Barclays Bank 
(Sutherland et al 2013:2) are recent cases in the UK banking sector. Within the Nigerian context, the case of Mrs 
Cecilia Ibru erstwhile MD of Oceanic Bank provides ready reference (Makinde 2013:109; Agbonkpolor 2010). 
The loss of institutional legitimacy can quickly lead to a crumbling of personal legitimacy and vice versa. Indeed, 
organisations and their actors can become contagions of legitimacy (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006; Riaz 2009) 
to one another. 
 
3. Conceptual Development: Customer Legitimacy Model 
The discussions on strategic choice, institutional theory and legitimacy have clarified meanings and drawn 
inferences from the financial world. The understanding that; “organizations and organizational actors not only 
seek to compete for resources, but they ultimately seek legitimacy and social acceptance” (Judge, et al 2010: 162) 
provides anchor for positioning the bank customer as a legitimizing agent for an institution that is seeking re-
engagement with her publics. Strategic choice theory that ascribed importance to the role played by 
organisational elites enables scrutiny to be placed on how this elite class in bank business run their banks; with 
Institutional theory shifting focus to the collective functioning of the banking industry – an agenda that is often 
the mandate of the regulator.  
A customer-centric disposition to the dynamics of relationship between the banks (or bankers), the 
regulator and the customer is proposed as a better premise for the emerging post-crisis discussion in banking. To 
this end, the article conceptualizes an industry legitimacy pyramid that gives primacy to the customer and seeks 




Figure1: Legitimacy pyramid for the Banking Industry. 
Figure 1 above is a proposition for a triadic inter-relationship in banking where the regulator and the banks 
appreciate that the basis of their existence is underpinned by a need for the institution to function for the 
customer. Policy or strategy of the regulator and the banks must be guided by the key question - what is in this 
for the customer?   
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The architecture of banking as evident in the last crisis was premised on over-reliance on regulation. Primacy 
resided in the hands of the regulator with respect to legitimacy. Branston et al (2006: 203) described regulation 
as ‘an arms-length response to failures in arms-length relationships’. King (2012:12) former Bank of England 
governor admitted the limitation of regulation in banking when he submitted that Basel III on its own cannot 
guarantee that another crisis will not happen. This suggests that legitimacy premised on regulator seem 
misplaced. 
The position of law that shareholders are the owners of business is also problematic for the banking 
public. It is depositors fund and not shareholders fund that keeps most banks in business. The question then is 
who really owns a bank – the depositor or the shareholder? Asher et al (2005) had ignited similar debate in their 
property rights view on stakeholder theory premised on other stakeholders apart from shareholders staking 
ownership claim on other assets of a firm (e.g. reputation or expertise).  
Segrestin and Hatchuel (2011) held the current position of corporate law on shareholder supremacy 
responsible for the 2008 financial crisis. They argued that the accountability imposed by agency position of law 
which hold managers accountable in the main to shareholders has promoted short termism. Decisions may be 
made by managers; they are solely made to maximize value for shareholders. Since it is the only insurance 
managers have to protect themselves against job loss and ensure better remuneration. Managers operate in an 
‘iron cage’ imposed by a corporate law that promote value maximization for shareholders, which may not 
necessarily be in the best interest of other stakeholders (e.g. customers) or the long term interest of the 
corporation. Ashton (2013) came to the conclusion that the law as it currently stands need a review after finding 
no basis in law upon which an action against Fred Goodwin for his role in the Royal Bank of Scotland debacle 
will succeed even if brought by shareholders whom the law accords supremacy amongst other stakeholders.  
This also raises query as to whether it is right for bank customers to be precluded from either the 
regulatory or governance structure of banks. Branston et al (2012:254-255) submitted that the elitist nature of 
strategic process of decision-making in the financial industry represent a barrier to strategic pursuit that is in the 
interest of the wider society, choice of strategy is cleverly tailored to the interest of the elite minority that control 
these entities. They made a case for an alternative model that will ensure democratization and promote what they 
called the ‘public’s articulation of a voice’. This proposed legitimacy model is a step in this direction. 
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